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Abstract 
 
This paper demonstrates the feasibility and usefulness of survey research asking respondents to 
report voting probabilities in hypothetical election scenarios.  Posing scenarios enriches the data 
available for studies of voting decisions, as a researcher can pose many more and varied 
scenarios than the elections that persons actually face.  Multiple scenarios were presented to over 
4,000 participants in the American Life Panel (ALP). Each described a hypothetical presidential 
election, giving characteristics measuring candidate preference, closeness of the election, and the 
time cost of voting.  Persons were asked the probability that they would vote in this election and 
were willing and able to respond.  We analyzed the data through direct study of the variation of 
voting probabilities with election characteristics and through estimation of a random utility 
model of voting.  Voting time and election closeness were notable determinants of decisions to 
vote, but not candidate preference.  Most findings were corroborated through estimation of a 
model fit to ALP data on respondents' actual voting behavior in the 2012 election. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Social scientists have long struggled to understand why persons vote in large elections 
and why turnout varies across elections.  See Aldrich (1993), Feddersen (2004), Geys (2006a, b) 
and Smets and van Ham (2013) for review articles. 
When performing empirical research on voting, it is natural to think first of analyzing 
data on actual elections.  Aggregate data on turnout at the district or other geographic level are 
readily available and occasionally enable creative analysis as natural experiments (e.g. Brady and 
McNulty, 2011).  However, these data do not describe individual voters and hence are ordinarily 
not well-suited to study interpersonal variation in decisions to vote.  
Surveys of individuals can provide richer data by asking persons to report their voting 
behavior, socioeconomic-demographic attributes, and their perceptions of election 
characteristics.  However, surveys of voting in actual elections have significant limitations.  
First, persons typically face actual elections only once every two or four years.  Second, there 
may not be much temporal variation in the characteristics of candidates and other aspects of 
actual elections.  Third, although theories of voting commonly consider an idealized setting in 
which a person chooses whether to participate in an isolated election for a single office, actual 
decisions to vote usually occur in a complex environment with contemporaneous elections for 
multiple offices and possibly ballot initiatives as well. 
Given these limitations of data on actual elections, we think it useful to also perform 
empirical studies that pose hypothetical election scenarios and ask persons how they would vote 
in these scenarios.  Data of this type can overcome the three limitations of data on actual 
elections.  The researcher can pose many more scenarios than the number of elections that 
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persons actually face.  The researcher can design the scenarios to exhibit considerable variation 
in the characteristics of candidates and other aspects of the election.  And one can pose scenarios 
that hypothesize an isolated election. 
Of course studies of voting in hypothetical elections are not a panacea.  One concern is 
that the responses that persons give may differ from the way that they would actually behave.  
Another is that the scenarios that a researcher can pose in practice inevitably omit some features 
of the environment that a person would face in an actual election.  These concerns are legitimate, 
but studies of hypothetical elections can still usefully add to the empirical evidence currently 
available for analysis of decisions to vote. 
The broad precedent for our study is a long history of applied econometric research that 
poses choice scenarios, asks persons to state the choices they would make in these scenarios, and 
uses the data to estimate random-utility models of choice behavior, in the same manner that data 
on actual choices would be used.  See, for example, Beggs, Cardell, and Hausman (1981), 
Fischer and Nagin (1981), Louviere and Woodworth (1983), Manski and Salomon (1987), and 
Ben-Akiva and Morikawa (1990). 
 Our specific precedents are the methodological and empirical studies of Manski (1999) 
and Blass, Lach, and Manski (2010).  Manski (1999) reasoned that stated choices may differ 
from actual ones because researchers provide respondents with different information than they 
have when facing actual choice problems.  The norm has been to pose incomplete scenarios, 
ones in which respondents are given only a subset of the information they would have in actual 
choice settings.  When scenarios are incomplete, stated choices cannot be more than point 
predictions of actual choices. 
 Elicitation of choice probabilities overcomes the inadequacy of stated-choice analysis by 
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permitting respondents to express uncertainty about their behavior in incomplete scenarios.  
Manski (1999) showed how elicited choice probabilities may be used to estimate random utility 
models with random coefficients.  Blass, Lach, and Manski (2010) used the methodology to 
estimate consumer preferences for electricity reliability.  The present paper uses it to estimate a 
random utility model of voting decisions, the data being voting probabilities in hypothetical 
elections. 
The broad idea of measuring choice intentions probabilistically has much precedent, 
dating back to Juster (1966).  See Manski (2004), Hurd (2009), and Delavande (2014) for review 
articles.  Eliciting choice intentions probabilistically might be viewed as more cognitively 
demanding than eliciting them verbally, yet previous research has amply illustrated its feasibility 
by showing that most respondents are able to respond meaningfully in probabilistic terms when 
asked about events germane to their lives.  Probabilistic measurement of voting intentions in 
actual elections has recently been implemented on a large scale in the American Life Panel 
(ALP).  Delavande and Manski (2010, 2012) study the voting probabilities that ALP respondents 
reported prior to the 2008 presidential election and the 2010 congressional and gubernatorial 
elections.  Kapteyn, Meijer, and Weerman (2014) study voting probabilities reported prior to the 
2012 presidential election. 
The present study differs from the above research using ALP data in two important 
respects.  First, it analyzes data on voting probabilities in hypothetical elections rather than 
voting probabilities prior to actual elections.    Second, it uses the data to study how the decision 
to vote varies with the characteristics of the election.  
Section 2 describes the ALP, the design of the election scenarios, and the sample whose 
responses we analyze.  Section 3 uses the data to examine the decision to vote.  We first present 
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suggestive findings on the univariate variation of voting probabilities with election 
characteristics. We next explain the structure and estimation of the random utility model.  We 
then pose a particular model specification and present the parameter estimates.  To close the 
empirical analysis, we compare the estimates with those of a similar model estimated using ALP 
data on respondents' actual voting decisions.  Section 4 discusses what we have learned 
substantively about voting and methodologically about survey research posing hypothetical 
election scenarios. 
 
 
2. Data Description 
 
2.1. The American Life Panel 
  
The American Life Panel is a national longitudinal survey of Americans of age 18 and 
older, begun by RAND in 2003.  Since its start, the ALP has expanded from about 500 to 
roughly 4,500 respondents. The ALP recruits participants from several sources, including 
representative samples of the population and convenience samples.1  
The ALP sampling process yields a wide spectrum of participants.  However, respondents 
over-represent some demographic groups relative to others.  The first column of Table 1 
describes the composition of the 4,329 participants who responded to at least one of the three 
survey waves that posed hypothetical election scenarios.  These waves were conducted several 
weeks apart in November and December 2012 following the presidential election.  Only U.S. 
citizens were invited to respond to the election questions. 
                                                          
1 For details see https://mmicdata.rand.org/alp/index.php?page=panelcomposition 
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Relative to the population of the United States, the participants were more often female 
(60 percent) and college educated (37 percent with 16 or more years of schooling compared to 28 
percent in the 2010 census; U.S. Census Bureau, 2013).  They were similar in terms of ethnic 
group (12 percent Black and 17 percent Latinos) and proportion of adults above age 65 (18 
percent).  Among panel members who participated in at least one of the three waves with 
hypothetical election scenarios, 60 percent participated in all waves and 24 percent in two. 
 
[Table 1 here] 
 
2.2. The Hypothetical Election Scenarios 
 
 ALP panel members participating in the three survey waves were asked their intention to 
vote in a set of hypothetical presidential elections.  Each scenario presented several election 
characteristics: (i) how much the participant likes each of the candidates, as measured on a 
thermometer scale previously used in the American National Election Survey, (ii) the closeness 
of the election as measured by a poll, and (iii) how costly it may be to vote in term of time.  As 
pointed out in the introduction, these are expected to be salient election-specific determinants of 
the decision to vote.  
The wording used to describe the hypothetical elections was as follows: 
 
We now would like you to consider whether you would choose to vote in several hypothetical 
U.S. presidential elections with two candidates: Candidate A and Candidate B.  In each case, we 
will ask you to imagine that 
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(a) You have specified assessments of the candidates in terms of the feeling thermometer. 
(Ratings between 50 degrees and 100 degrees mean that you feel favorable and warm toward the 
person. Ratings between 0 degrees and 50 degrees mean that you don't feel favorable toward the 
person and that you don't care too much for that person. You rate the person at the 50 degree 
mark if you don't feel particularly warm or cold toward the person.) 
(b)  You know the results of a major poll released a week before the election 
(c) It takes you a specified amount of time to go to your voting place and vote. 
 
Figure 1 shows the screen that participants saw with the characteristics of the election.  
 
[Figure 1 here] 
 
Respondents faced eight distinct scenarios in each survey wave, totaling twenty four in 
all.  The thermometer rating for Candidates A and B respectively could take two different values 
(60-40 and 20-80).  The polling data included the percent chance that A will win the election 
(with one of the three values 70%, 50% and 30%) and the percent chance that the vote margin 
between the two candidates will be less than 2% (with one of the two values 25% and 85%).  The 
time required to vote was specified as the percent chance that it will take less than one hour to 
vote (with one of the two values 10% and 90%).  The twenty-four scenarios represent all 
possible combinations of these values.2 The order of presentations of the scenarios was the same 
for all respondents. 
                                                          
2  The twenty-four scenarios thus include settings in which the two items of polling data take all 
combinations of values.  One might question whether an election could realistically have an 85 percent 
chance of a vote margin less than 2% and a 70-30 chance that a particular candidate will win.  These two 
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Voting intentions for each scenario were elicited using a probabilistic format with the 
following question: 
 
In this scenario, what do you think is the percent chance that you would go to your voting place 
and vote in the hypothetical presidential election? 
 
Probabilistic polling is an alternative to verbal questioning that asks persons to state, in percent-
chance terms, the likelihood that they will vote and for whom.  The objective is to provide 
readily interpretable, interpersonally comparable, quantitative measures of the uncertainty that 
persons perceive about their voting behavior.  Delavande and Manski (2010) found that 
responses to traditional verbal polling and probabilistic questions regarding an actual presidential 
election were well-aligned ordinally.  Moreover, the probabilistic responses predicted actual 
voting behavior beyond what was possible using verbal responses alone. 
The item non-response rates in our study are very low, varying between 1.5% and 4.6% 
depending on the scenario.  Thus, respondents are willing to express their voting intention in 
probabilistic format. A bit of respondent fatigue over the 24 scenarios can be seen, with a slight 
increase in the item non-response rate at wave 3 (above 3.2% for all 8 scenarios) compared to 
wave 1 (below 2% for all 8 scenarios), but nonresponse was still quite low even in wave 3. 
To assess the reliability of responses to the questions about hypothetical elections, we 
repeated in waves 2 and 3 a scenario that respondents had already encountered in wave 1.  We 
found that 47 and 50 percent of the respondents provided the exact same responses at waves 2 
and 3 respectively.  The median differences in answers compared to wave 1 were 0 at both waves 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
items of polling data are consistent in principle.  In particular, they could co-occur in an election with a 
polarized populace in which one political party has a few percent more adherents than the other.  
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2 and 3, and the mean differences were 1.7 and 0.5 respectively. These very small differences 
give re-assurance that participants thought about the scenario and answered seriously.  Further 
evidence that participants answered seriously will be given in Sections 2.3 and 3.4, where we 
compare voting probabilities in the hypothetical scenarios with actual voting behavior in the 
2012 election. 
 
2.3. The Analytical Sample 
 
Inspecting the voting probabilities that persons reported across the scenarios in which 
they participated, we found that 72.7 percent (3117 persons) sometimes expressed uncertainty 
about whether they would vote.  Of the rest, 26 percent (1130 persons) gave a 100% chance of 
voting in every scenario and 1.7 percent (75 persons) always gave a 0% response.  A negligible 
0.002 percent (7 persons) reported 100% to all scenarios in one wave and 0% to all scenarios in 
another wave. 
Our analysis of voting decisions focuses on the first group, whose voting probabilities 
vary across scenarios.  We refer to this group as the analytical sample.  We call the second group 
always voters and the third group never voters.  It seems evident that the decision to vote for 
always voters and never voters are based on different criteria than those we study.  The fourth 
tiny group appear not to have answered the survey seriously, so we call them non-credible 
respondents. 
Table 1 describes the characteristics of the four groups.  Always voters are more likely to 
be white, non-Latino, older and more educated than are members of the analytical sample. 
Consistent with their answers to the hypothetical scenarios, 99 percent of the always voters 
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reported that they actually voted for president in 2012.  Never voters are more likely to be white, 
non-Latino, younger and less educated than are members of the analytical sample.  Consistent 
with their answers to the hypothetical scenarios, only 9 percent of the never voters reported that 
they actually voted for president in 2012. The group of non-credible group is too small for its 
characteristics to be usefully compared with the other groups. 
Relative to the population of the United States, the composition of the analytical sample 
is more female (61 percent) and college educated (34 percent with 16 or more years of 
schooling).  The group is more likely to actually vote than the general population.  Whereas 81 
percent of the analytical sample reported in a post-election survey that they had voted for 
president in 2012, the national turnout is estimated to have been about 58 percent (McDonald, 
2012).  The analytical sample also appears more Democrat than the general population, with 60 
percent reporting having voted for Barack Obama, compared to 51 percent in the general 
population. 
 Figure 2 presents the distribution of voting probabilities in the analytical sample across 
the twenty-four election scenarios. It shows overall high voting intention. The most common 
answer is 100% (26 percent of the answers), followed by 50% (11 percent) and 90% (10 
percent). Figure 2 also shows substantial heterogeneity in voting probabilities and use of the 
whole range from 0 to 100%. The median and mean responses are 85% and 72% respectively.  
We think that the relatively high voting probabilities reported by APL respondents stems 
mainly from the fact that the panel over-represents groups who vote at a higher rate than the 
electorate.  However, a contributing reason may be overreporting of voting, as found by Belli, 
Traugott, and Beckmann (2001) in their comparison of self-reports of voting on the American 
National Election Survey (ANES) with administrative data from voting records.  We conjecture 
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that ALP self-reports suffer less from overreporting than do ANES ones.  The methodological 
literature suggests that responses to internet surveys may be more accurate due to the absence of 
an interviewer, with consequent reduction of social desirability bias (Bradburn and Sudman, 
1979; Tourangeau and Smith, 1996). 
 
[Figure 2 here] 
 
 
3. The Decision to Vote 
 
3.1. Univariate Variation of Voting Probabilities with Election Characteristics 
 
 As prelude to specification and estimation of a random utility model of voting, we 
examined how voting probabilities vary with each election characteristic given in a scenario, 
taken one at a time.  Table 2 presents the findings, which hint at what we will find with formal 
modelling of decision making.  Each row of the table holds one election characteristic fixed and 
presents the mean, median, and other quantiles of the voting probabilities across all scenarios 
having the fixed characteristic.  The row sample sizes are quite large, being about 29,000 for 
those characteristics that take two values in our design and 19,000 for the election-closeness 
characteristic that takes three values. 
 
[Table 2 here] 
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 Travel time yields the largest variation in voting probabilities.  The mean voting 
probability is 75.2% when the scenario specifies a 10% chance that voting will take more than 
one hour and is 68.0% when it specifies a 90% chance that voting will take more than one hour.  
The median voting probabilities are 90% and 80% respectively. 
 Each scenario provides two measures of the closeness of the election---the chance that 
each candidate will win and the chance that the vote margin will be less than 2 percent.  Voting 
probabilities vary more with the former than with the latter.  The mean voting probability is 
73.4% when the poll states an even chance that each candidate will win and is 71.2% or 70.1% 
when the poll states that candidate A or B respectively is favoured to win.  The median voting 
probability is 90% when the poll states an even chance for each candidate and drops to 80% 
when one candidate or the other is favoured.  The specified chance that the vote margin will be 
less than 2% barely affects the mean probability of voting, it being 71.9% when the poll gives a 
high chance of a small vote margin and 71.3% when it gives a low chance.  The median voting 
probabilities are 85% and 80% respectively. 
 While the magnitudes of these univariate associations vary, the directions are all 
consistent with usual thinking about instrumental voting.  The findings regarding candidate 
preference are a slight anomaly.  Theories of instrumental voting, as well as some theories of 
expressive voting, predict that persons have more incentive to vote if they strongly prefer one 
candidate over the other.  Using the feeling thermometer to indicate strength of candidate 
preference, however, we find that voting probabilities tend to be a bit higher when preference is 
weak.  The mean voting probability is 72.2% when candidates A and B have 60/40 ratings and 
71.0% when they have 20/80 ratings.  The median voting probabilities are 85% and 80% 
respectively. 
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For completeness, we present in Appendix Table A1 the mean and median voting 
probabilities for all 24 scenarios. It shows that the mean (median) varies between 66% and 78% 
(75% and 90%) across the various scenarios. 
 
3.2. The Random Utility Model 
 
 Specification and estimation of a random-utility model of decision making provides an 
effective way to investigate how election characteristics and personal attributes jointly influence 
voting probabilities. We use the same model structure and estimation methods as Manski (1999) 
and Blass, Lach and Manski (2010). 
 To begin, we assume that the utility of individual i from alternative j (j = 1 if i votes and 
0 otherwise) has the random-coefficients form 
 
                                              Uij  =  xijβi  +  εij .                                 (1) 
 
Here xij is a specified function of election characteristics and personal attributes that are 
observable by both the decision maker and the researcher when scenarios are posed and that also 
would be observable in an actual choice setting.  In our context, xij is a function of the election 
characteristics presented in an ALP scenario and of the personal attributes reported by ALP 
participants.  The additive utility component εij would be observable by the decision maker in an 
actual choice setting but is not part of the information presented in an ALP scenario.  For 
example, εij might depend on other election characteristics such as the policy positions and 
ethnicities of the candidates.  Let xi ≡ (xij, j = 0, 1) and εi  ≡  (εij, j = 0, 1). 
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Eliciting voting probabilities enables ALP respondents to express uncertainty about εi, 
and, hence, about their voting behavior.  It permits a person to treat εi as a vector of utility 
components whose value is not known when responding to the choice scenario but which would 
be known in an actual choice setting.  Formally, we assume that person i forms a continuous 
subjective distribution for εi, say Qi, derives the subjective probability that he would vote in an 
actual choice setting, and reports this subjective probability as his response to a scenario.  If 
person i has utility function (1), the subjective voting probability is the probability that he places 
on the event that the realizations of εi will make voting optimal.  Thus, we assume that the 
reported voting probability is 
 
 qi  =  Qi[xi1βi + εi1 > xi0βi + εi0].        (2) 
 
The standard practice in stated-choice analysis has been to assume that the components of 
εi are objectively i. i. d. with the extreme-value distribution.  Suppose that respondents make the 
same assumption subjectively.  Then voting probability (2) has the logit form 
 
 qi  =  𝑒xi1βi𝑒xi0βi+𝑒xi1βi.    (3) 
 
Applying the log-odds transformation to (3) yields the linear mixed-logit model (McFadden and 
Train, 2000) 
 
𝑙𝑙 �
qi
1−qi
� = (xi1 − xi0)βi = (xi1 − xi0)b + ui1,  (4) 
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where βi = b + 𝜂𝑖 and ui1 = (xi1 − xi0)𝜂𝑖. 
 Finally, assume that the cross-sectional distribution of β, hence η, is statistically 
independent of x.  Without loss of generality, set E(η) = 0 as a normalization.   It then follows 
that b = E(β), E(u│x) = 0, and (4) is the linear mean regression model 
 
𝐸 �𝑙𝑙 �
qi
1−qi
�� x� = (xi1 − xi0)b.        (5) 
 
If model (5) is taken literally, the mean preference parameters b may be consistently 
estimated by least squares, without need to assume anything about the shape of the distribution 
of β.  This contrasts with standard econometric analysis, where the researcher must specify a 
parametric family of distributions for β. However, we cannot take the model quite literally.  As 
shown in Figure 2, respondents tend to round their responses to the nearest five or ten percent.  
Such minor rounding has been found to be commonplace in elicitation of subjective 
probabilities; see Manski and Molinari (2010). 
 Rounding of interior subjective probabilities (say, from 47 percent to 50 percent) is 
relatively unproblematic.  However, rounding of values near zero and one raises a serious 
difficulty due to the sensitivity of the log odd function near the boundaries of the [0, 1] interval.  
At the extreme, over a quarter of the respondents report voting probabilities equal to zero or one, 
thus generating log odds that equal minus or plus infinity.  Hence, least squares estimation 
breaks down.3 
                                                          
3 One should not drop the cases with choice probabilities equal to zero or one, because this truncates the 
sample in a response-based manner.  One might consider an ad hoc transformation of reported zeroes and 
ones to values near these boundaries, but the least squares estimates may be sensitive to the 
transformation performed. 
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The inference problem can be resolved if preferences are symmetrically distributed with 
center at b.  Then the unobserved uij are symmetrically distributed about zero conditional on xi 
and, hence, have median zero conditional on xi.  Thus, we have the linear median regression 
model 
 
𝑀 �𝑙𝑙 �
qi
1−qi
�� x� = (xi1 − xi0)b,        (6) 
 
whose parameters may be estimated by least absolute deviations (LAD). A well-known 
robustness property of the median of a random variable is its invariance to transformations that 
do not alter the ordering of values relative to the median.  In our empirical analysis, we transform 
voting probabilities of zero and one to 0.001 and 0.999 respectively.4  We then estimate model 
(6) by LAD to estimate the center of symmetry of the preference distribution. 
 
3.3. Model Specification and Parameter Estimates 
 
 Tables 3 and 4 present estimates for a model that specifies x as a vector of binary 
variables describing election characteristics and personal attributes.  As shown in Table 3, the 
personal attributes measure sex, marital status, ethnicity, working status, years of education, and 
age.  The specification includes four variables that summarize the election characteristics 
presented in a scenario: (i) strength of candidate preference, measured by a variable that equals 
                                                          
4 If y is a random variable with median M, then M is also the median of any function f(y) such that 
( )y M f y M< ⇒ <  and ( ) .y M f y M> ⇒ >   This holds even if the function f transforms small 
values of y to -∞ and large ones to ∞, or vice versa.  Hence, equation (6) continues to be the same linear 
median regression if subjective probabilities equal to zero and one are replaced by values close to zero 
and one. 
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one if the thermometer ratings for candidates A and B are 20-80 and zero if the rating is 60-40; 
(ii) closeness of the election, measured by a variable that equals one if the probability that A 
wins is 50% and zero otherwise; (iii) interaction of candidate preference and closeness of the 
election, measured by a variable that equals one if both variables (i) and (ii) equal one and equals 
zero otherwise; and (iv) voting time, measured by a variable that equals one if the probability 
that voting will take more than one hour is 90% and equals zero if the probability is 10%. 
 The model does not include a variable measuring the polling report of the chance of a 
small vote margin.  The univariate findings of Section 3.1 and the summary statistics in Table A1 
indicate that the information on the vote margin given in a scenario had negligible effect on 
voting probabilities. This finding was corroborated in exploratory analysis in which we estimated 
models using only data on certain scenarios: (i) scenarios with close elections, in which the 
probability that A wins is given as 50%, and (ii) scenarios that exclude non-close elections in 
which the probability of a vote margin less than 2% is given as 85%.  It may be that vote margin 
was a difficult concept for respondents to grasp. Alternatively, respondents may understand the 
concept but not use forecasts of vote margin when they decide whether to vote. 
 Table 3 presents the LAD estimate of the center of symmetry of the preference 
distribution.  Beneath each parameter estimate is a standard error.5  The parameter estimates 
show, as suggested earlier by the univariate findings, that voting probabilities rise when the 
scenario describes a close election and a short waiting time to vote.  The estimate associated with 
                                                          
5 Recall that the unobserved component of utility in equation (4) has the form .)( 1 iiijij xxu η−=   
Thus, the random parameter specification implies that u is heteroskedastic and that it is correlated across 
the scenarios faced by a given sample member.  These features of u do not affect the consistency of LAD 
estimation but do affect statistical inference.  We obtained the standard errors of the parameter estimates 
by cluster bootstrapping the sample.  Cluster bootstrapping means that, to generate a pseudo-estimate of 
the parameters, we drew respondents with replacement from the actual sample of respondents and used 
the data on all of the scenarios faced by these persons to re-estimate the model. We repeated this process 
500 times to generate 500 pseudo estimates of b. The reported standard errors are the standard deviations 
of these 500 pseudo estimates. 
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voting time is 2.5 times larger than the one for closeness of the election, strengthening the 
univariate finding that voting time is an important determinant of voting decisions.  Both 
coefficients are precisely estimated.  Contrary to various theories of voting but in line with the 
univariate findings, the parameter estimates indicate that having a strong preference for a 
candidate does not increase the probability of voting.  The estimated effect is close to zero in a 
close election (-0.105 + 0.111) and negative (-0.105) when the poll indicates that the election is 
not close.  Considering personal attributes, we find that Latinos are less likely to vote, while 
white, married, older and more educated participants are more likely to vote.6 Appendix Table 
A2 presents alternative parameter estimates computed by least squares and shows similar 
patterns. 
[Table 3 here] 
 
To obtain further perspective on the implications of the parameter estimates for voting, 
Table 4 shows how changing one variable at a time affects the predicted probability of voting 
relative to a baseline value of x and β.  As baseline, we set β equal to the estimate of the center of 
symmetry of the preference distribution given in Table 3.  We set x = (female, married, working, 
white, non-Latino, aged 50 to 59, 13 to 15 years of education, with an election scenario where 
the ratings for candidates A and B are 60-40, the poll indicates that the election is not close, and 
the probability that it will take more than one hour to vote is 10%).  The predicted voting 
probability for this baseline case is 91.6%.  Varying the election characteristics one at a time, we 
find that increasing the voting time reduces the predicted probability of voting by 7.2%.  
Changing the scenario to one where the poll predicts a close election increases the predicted 
                                                          
6 These findings are broadly consistent with recent empirical evidence on the association of personal 
attributes with voting rates in actual elections; see Smets and van Haan (2013). 
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probability of voting by 1.9%.  Considering personal attributes, changing education to 12 years 
or less reduces the predicted probability by 7.7%, while changing it to 16 years or more increases 
the predicted probability by 4.2%. 
 
[Table 4 here] 
 
 
3.4. Comparison with a Logit Model of Actual Voting 
 
 We observed in the Introduction that a concern with analysis of stated choice data is that 
the responses persons give when facing hypothetical scenarios may differ from the way that they 
would actually behave.  In Section 2.3 we gave initial evidence of the consistency of stated 
voting probabilities and actual voting decisions, namely that 99 percent of the always voters and 
only 9 percent of the never voters reported that they had actually voted in the 2012 presidential 
election.  In this section, we provide further evidence by examining the actual voting decisions of 
a sub-sample of 1923 members of the analytical sample for whom we have complete data. 
 In September-October 2012, ALP respondents were asked to report their personal 
thermometer ratings for Barack Obama and Mitt Romney.  Table 1 shows that the mean response 
in the analytical sample was 54 for Obama and 41 for Romney (column 2).  Persons were also 
asked to report the percent chance that it would take them more than an hour to vote.7  Here the 
                                                          
7 Specifically, they were asked to “think about the time it will take to go to [their] voting place and vote if 
[they] do vote in the presidential election on November 6th 2012” and to report the percent chance that it 
will take (i) less than 30 minutes, (ii) at least 30 minutes but less than one hour, (iii) at least one hour but 
less than two hours and (iv) at least two hours. (taking into account both the time it takes to go to the 
voting place and the waiting time to cast a ballot). We keep respondents whose answers sum up to 100% 
(95% of observations). 
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mean response was 17%.  Thus, the ALP provides actual pre-election data on two of the election 
characteristics that we later specified in the hypothetical scenarios.  Moreover, an ALP wave 
conducted after the 2012 election asked respondents whether they had actually voted.  Table 1 
shows that 80.7% of the analytical sample reported that they had voted. 
 Table 5 presents estimates of a logit model explaining actual voting decisions as a 
function of personal attributes and the pre-election reports of candidate preference and voting 
time.  The logit model assumes that utility is similar to but not precisely the same as the function 
Uij  =  xijβi  +  εij given in equation (1).  In particular, the components of εi are assumed to be 
objectively rather than subjectively i. i. d. with the extreme-value distribution.  
 The components of x include the same personal attributes as used in the hypothetical 
choice analysis but the election characteristics differ.  Rather than using binary variables to 
measure candidate preference and voting time, we measure candidate preference by the absolute 
difference in thermometer ratings between the candidates and voting time by the reported 
probability that voting would take longer than an hour. 
 
[Table 5 here] 
 
 The final difference is that the specification of x omits any measure of election closeness 
and, consequently, any interaction of election closeness and candidate preference.  The ALP did 
not provide polling reports to respondents prior to the election.  Even if it had, there would have 
been no cross-sectional variation in the data, making it impossible to estimate the effect of 
polling on voting decisions.  This illustrates one of the advantages of studies of voting in 
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hypothetical elections over analysis of actual voting data, as the former enables one to pose 
multiple scenarios that vary the content of polling reports. 
 Comparison of the parameters for personal attributes presented in Tables 3 and 5 is 
straightforward because, in both cases, the attributes are measured as the same binary variables.   
The estimates are remarkably similar in most cases, not only in sign but in magnitude as well.  
The two notable exceptions concern ethnicity.  The model using data on actual voting decisions 
shows blacks and Latinos to place much higher utility on voting than does the model using data 
on hypothetical elections.  We see a simple explanation for this finding, namely that Barack 
Obama was a presidential candidate who was very strongly preferred by blacks and Latinos.  Our 
specification of scenarios for hypothetical elections did not provide information on the ethnicity 
or policies of candidates, information that voters possess when considering whether to vote in 
actual elections. 
 Now consider the parameters for election characteristics, which are measured differently 
in Tables 3 and 5.  In the case of voting time, the binary variable in Table 3 measures the effect 
on utility of increasing the chance that voting takes more than an hour from 10% to 90%.  The 
quantitative variable in Table 5 measures the effect on utility of increasing the chance that voting 
takes more than an hour by 1%.  The parameter estimates are -0.71 and -.014 respectively; both 
are statistically precise.  To make the estimates comparable in scale, we need to multiply the 
latter one by 80% (the difference between 10% and 90%).  Doing so yields -1.12.  Thus, after 
appropriate rescaling, the two estimates are rather similar to one another. 
In the case of candidate preference, Table 3 measures the effect on utility of changing the 
relative thermometer ranking of the two candidates from 60-40 to 20-80 in elections that are or 
are not forecast to be close. The quantitative variable in Table 5 measures the effect on utility of 
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increasing the absolute difference of the rankings by one point without conditioning on the 
closeness of the election.  To make the estimate in Table 5 comparable in scale to those in Table 
3, we need to multiply the Table 5 estimate of 0.014 by 40 (the difference between |60 – 40| and 
|20 – 80|).  Doing so yields 0.56.  Whereas the estimates based on hypothetical election data are 
anomalous from the perspective of various theories of voting, the estimate based on actual 
election data is consistent with theory. 
 
 
4. Discussion 
 
The most basic contribution of this paper is to demonstrate the feasibility and usefulness 
of large-scale survey research asking respondents to report voting probabilities in hypothetical 
election scenarios.  Posing hypothetical scenarios substantially enriches the data available for 
studies of voting decisions.  A researcher can pose many more and varied scenarios than the 
elections that persons actually face.   
We found that ALP panel members were willing and able to respond to the scenarios 
posed.  Three types of evidence indicate that participants took their decision task seriously.  First, 
the responses had high test-retest reliability when a scenario from wave 1 was repeated in waves 
2 and 3 (Section 2.2).  Second, the extreme voting probabilities provided by always voters and 
never voters correspond well with the fact that almost all members of the former group and few 
members of the latter group actually voted in 2012 (Section 2.3).  Third, most parameter 
estimates of our random utility model fitted to voting probabilities in hypothetical elections were 
rather similar to ones in a model fitted to actual voting data (Section 3.4).  The dissimilarity of 
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the estimates for blacks and Latinos is easily explained by the special circumstance of the Obama 
candidacy in 2012.  The only open question is the source of the dissimilarity in the estimates for 
candidate preference. 
Considering our empirical findings, we particularly call attention to the effect of voting 
time on decisions to vote.  It is reasonable to expect that having to wait a long time would deter 
voting, but quantification of the effect using data on actual elections is difficult.  Quantification 
is important because policy choices---the location and size of polling stations, voting hours, 
provisions for early and absentee voting, and so on---can influence voting times considerably. 
We find voting time to be an important determinant of voting decisions, with voting 
probabilities tending to be about 7% higher when voting time is short (90% chance of less than 
an hour) than when they are long (90% chance of more than an hour).  This empirical finding is 
robust across data sources, appearing both when we analyze voting probabilities in hypothetical 
elections and actual voting in the 2012 election.     
 Our findings on how election closeness affects voting decisions are suggestive but more 
tentative, suggesting considerable scope for future research.  Our specification of election 
scenarios included two measures of election closeness, the chance that each candidate would win 
and the chance that the vote margin would be small.  We found that ALP panel members reacted 
moderately to the former measure and negligibly to the latter one.  These reactions may describe 
how persons really use polling reports when deciding to vote. Alternatively, the negligible effect 
of predicted vote margin may have stemmed from the complexity of the phrasing of our 
scenarios, which specified the "percent chance that the vote margin between the two candidates 
will be less than 2%."  We think that a worthwhile direction for future research would be to 
explore how persons respond when alternative wording is used to convey polling information.   
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Figure 1: Screen viewed by respondents for one particular election scenario 
 
 
Your ratings for the feeling thermometer   
Candidate A 60 
Candidate B 40 
    
Forecast by a major poll the week before the 
election  
Percent chance that Candidate A will win the election 70 
Percent chance that Candidate B will win the election 
 
30 
Percent chance that the vote margin between the two 
candidates will be less than 2% 
85 
    
 Time it will take you to go to voting place and 
vote   
Percent chance it will take you less than 1 hour 10 
Percent chance it will take you more than 1 hour 90 
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Figure 2: Distribution of probability of voting across the 24 scenarios 
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Table 1: Characteristics of respondents who participated in at least one wave 
 
Characteristics 
All 
Persons 
whose 
voting 
probabilities 
varies 
across 
choice sets 
Always 
voters 
Never 
voters 
Non-
credible 
respondents 
Female 59.9 60.9 57.5 56.0 42.9 
Married 58.8 57.0 63.2 66.7 57.1 
Working 58.2 57.7 59.2 66.7 28.6 
White 77.5 74.7 84.7 88.0 71.4 
Black 12.0 12.8 9.9 6.7 14.3 
Latino 17.0 20.4 8.1 10.7 28.6 
Less than than 30 years old 13.1 14.8 7.5 28.0 14.3 
30 to 39  years old 17.3 18.8 12.5 24.0 14.3 
40 to 49  years old 17.0 17.2 16.7 13.3 14.3 
50 to 59  years old 24.2 23.1 27.9 18.7 14.3 
60-69 years old 18.9 17.6 22.8 13.3 14.3 
70+ years old 9.6 8.6 12.6 2.7 28.6 
0-12 years of education 23.7 27.6 11.6 46.7 14.3 
13-15 years of education 39.3 38.6 40.6 44.0 57.1 
16+ years of education 37.0 33.8 47.8 9.3 28.6 
Voted in November 2012 
elections 84.4 80.7 99.0 9.4 100.0 
Voted for Obama 57.4 59.5 52.8 50.0 60.0 
Thermometer rating for Obama 53.1 54.1 51.3 35.0 41.5 
Thermometer rating for Romney 41.9 41.1 44.1 32.9 45.0 
Probability voting takes more 
than 1 hour 14.7 16.5 10.4 15.2 10.0 
      Maximum N 4329 3117 1130 75 7 
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Table 2: Univariate Variation of Voting Probabilities with Election Characteristics 
 
Scenarios Mean 
25th 
perc. median 
75th 
perc. N 
Overall 71.601 50 85 100 58263 
Rating of feeling thermometer is A:60 and B:40 72.208 50 85 100 29151 
Rating of feeling thermometer is A:20 and B:80 70.992 50 80 100 29112 
Probability that A wins is 70% and B wins is 30% 71.236 50 80 100 19606 
Probability that A wins is 30% and B wins is 70% 70.121 50 80 99 19545 
Probability that A wins is 50% and B wins is 50% 73.489 50 90 100 19112 
Probability that vote margin is less than 2% is 85% 71.884 50 85 100 29884 
Probability that vote margin is less than 2% is 25% 71.302 50 80 100 28379 
Probability voting takes more than 1 hour = 10% 75.171 50 90 100 29135 
Probability voting takes more than 1 hour = 90% 68.030 50 80 99 29128 
 
  
29 
 
Table 3: LAD estimates of utility function parameters  
 
Dependent variable is ln( prob of voting / (1- prob of voting) ) Coefficients 
A rating = 20  -0.105 
 
[0.027] 
Probability that A wins = 50% 0.282 
 
[0.039] 
A rating = 20  & Probability that A wins = 50 0.111 
 
[0.043] 
Probability voting takes more than 1 hour = 90% -0.706 
 
[0.034] 
Female -0.123 
 
[0.087] 
Married 0.237 
 
[0.097] 
White 0.304 
 
[0.114] 
Black -0.039 
 
[0.151] 
Latino -0.319 
 
[0.099] 
Working 0.144 
 
[0.093] 
13-15 years of education 0.741 
 
[0.096] 
16+ years of education 1.471 
 
[0.123] 
30-39 years old 0.237 
 
[0.126] 
40-49 0.595 
 
[0.126] 
50-59 0.964 
 
[0.133] 
60-69 1.491 
 
[0.165] 
70+ 1.954 
 
[0.281] 
Constant 0.126 
 
[0.161] 
  N 58,263 
Bootstrapped standard errors clustered at the individual level in brackets (500 replications) 
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Table 4: Change in predicted probability of voting for change in independent variables 
(based on estimates from Table 3) 
 
Predicted probability for base characteristics* 91.63 
  Change to A rating = 20  -0.84 
Change to Probability that A wins = 50% 1.92 
Change to A rating = 20  & Probability that A wins = 50 1.96 
Change to Probability voting takes more than 1 hour = 90% -7.24 
Change to male 0.89 
Change to non-married -2.01 
Change to black -3.03 
Change to non-white non-black -2.64 
Change to Latino -2.80 
Change to non-working -1.17 
Change to 12 years of education or less -7.71 
Change to 16+ years of education 4.15 
Change to less than 30 years old -10.95 
Change to 30-39 years old -7.52 
Change to 40-49 years old -3.30 
Change to 60-69 years old 3.25 
Change to 70+ years old 5.08 
 
*The predicted probability is computed for an individual with x = (female, married, working, 
white, non-Latino, aged 50 to 59, 13 to 15 years of education, with an election scenario where 
the ratings for candidates A and B are 60-40, the poll indicates that the election is not close, and 
the probability that it will take more than one hour to vote is 10%).   
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Table 5: Logit estimates of utility function parameters 
  
Dependent variable is voted in 2012 Coefficients 
Absolute difference of rating between  
Obama and Romney 0.014 
 
[0.002] 
Probability that voting takes more 
than 1 hour  -0.014 
 
[0.002] 
female -0.094 
 
[0.150] 
married 0.249 
 
[0.149] 
white 0.542 
 
[0.224] 
black 1.143 
 
[0.323] 
latino 0.455 
 
[0.158] 
working 0.412 
 
[0.206] 
13-15 years of education 0.972 
 
[0.165] 
16+ years of education 1.831 
 
[0.201] 
30-39 years old 0.030 
 
[0.227] 
40-49 0.510 
 
[0.241] 
50-59 0.948 
 
[0.235] 
60-69 1.438 
 
[0.287] 
70+ 1.895 
 
[0.397] 
Constant -1.186 
 
[0.351] 
  N 1923 
 
 Standard errors in brackets 
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Table A1: Mean and median probabilities of voting, by scenario 
  
Prob that vote 
margin is less 
than 2% is 85%   
Prob that vote 
margin is less 
than 2% is 25% 
  
Mean Med 
 
Mean Med 
Thermometer ratings are A:60 and B:40; 
Prob that A wins is 70%; Prob that voting 
takes more than 1 hour is 10% 
76.3 90 
 
76.0 90 
Thermometer ratings are A:60 and B:40; 
Prob that A wins is 70%; Prob that voting 
takes more than 1 hour is 90% 
69.7 80 
 
68.3 80 
Thermometer ratings are A:20 and B:80; 
Prob that A wins is 70%; Prob that voting 
takes more than 1 hour is 10% 
74.9 90 
 
72.0 85 
Thermometer ratings are A:20 and B:80; 
Prob that A wins is 70%; Prob that voting 
takes more than 1 hour is 90% 
67.7 80 
 
66.3 75 
Thermometer ratings are A:60 and B:40; 
Prob that A wins is 30%; Prob that voting 
takes more than 1 hour is 10% 
73.6 90 
 
73.4 85 
Thermometer ratings are A:60 and B:40; 
Prob that A wins is 30%; Prob that voting 
takes more than 1 hour is 90% 
66.3 75 
 
67.8 80 
Thermometer ratings are A:20 and B:80; 
Prob that A wins is 30%; Prob that voting 
takes more than 1 hour is 10% 
73.9 90 
 
73.6 90 
Thermometer ratings are A:20 and B:80; 
Prob that A wins is 30%; Prob that voting 
takes more than 1 hour is 90% 
65.2 75 
 
65.7 75 
Thermometer ratings are A:60 and B:40; 
Prob that A wins is 50%; Prob that voting 
takes more than 1 hour is 10% 
77.7 90 
 
77.8 90 
Thermometer ratings are A:60 and B:40; 
Prob that A wins is 50%; Prob that voting 
takes more than 1 hour is 90% 
69.9 80 
 
69.9 80 
Thermometer ratings are A:20 and B:80; 
Prob that A wins is 50%; Prob that voting 
takes more than 1 hour is 10% 
76.6 90 
 
77.1 90 
Thermometer ratings are A:20 and B:80; 
Prob that A wins is 50%; Prob that voting 
takes more than 1 hour is 90% 
71.0 85 
  
68.6 80 
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Table A2: OLS estimates of utility function parameters 
 
Dependent variable is ln( prob of voting / (1- prob of voting) ) Coefficients 
A rating = 20  -0.174 
 
[0.033] 
Probability that A wins = 50% 0.287 
 
[0.044] 
A rating = 20  & Probability that A wins = 50 0.154 
 
[0.059] 
Probability voting takes more than 1 hour = 90% -0.721 
 
[0.027] 
Female -0.145 
 
[0.028] 
Married 0.262 
 
[0.030] 
White 0.256 
 
[0.046] 
Black 0.003 
 
[0.061] 
Latino -0.264 
 
[0.039] 
Working 0.149 
 
[0.031] 
13-15 years of education 0.843 
 
[0.036] 
16+ years of education 1.405 
 
[0.038] 
30-39 years old 0.195 
 
[0.048] 
40-49 0.569 
 
[0.047] 
50-59 0.952 
 
[0.045] 
60-69 1.410 
 
[0.051] 
70+ 1.742 
 
[0.065] 
Constant 0.695 
 
[0.068] 
  N 58,263 
 
Bootstrapped standard errors clustered at the individual level in brackets (500 replications) 
